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Response: Some Thoughts on The
Directors' Evolving Role
By DONALD E. SCHWARTZ*
Marshall Small's article quite correctly focuses the corporate social
responsibility issue on the process by which corporations act. This
helps extricate us from the semantical goo that often surrounds discus-
sion of corporate social responsibility; for example whether it means
corporate philanthropy or internalizing social costs, or something else.
Essentially, I believe it means conducting one's business with an eye to
the manner in which external constituencies are affected, but I confess
that that mix of words does not paint a truly representational portrait.
That is why I think it is more fruitful to talk about process.
On aspect of the corporate process, the governance structure, has
received considerable attention in recent times. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, various commit-
tees of the United States Senate, the American Law Institute, the
American Bar Association, the Business Roundtable, and the American
Assembly, have all probed the issue of how the corporation should be
organized in order to meet its responsibilities. By and large, those who
have taken part in this examination have thought in terms of protection
of corporate investors. They were not seeking methods for altering the
governance scheme so as to better enable the corporation to face its
other publics. Marshall Small, however, recognizes that these two
broad categories of claimants, investors and those affected by corporate
conduct, will have conflicting demands, and most of these must be re-
solved by corporate managers acting in their discretion. Thus, al-
though there are other factors bearing on the resolution of the conflict,
such as numerous regulatory laws, there is a need to provide a corpo-
rate framework to work through the problems internally.
One requirement is to come up with a handle on the problem;
there is a need for a conceptual framework. Mr. Small states that deci-
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sion makers must be guided by the "longterm interests of the owners of
the enterprise in its economic survival and success." This outlook pro-
vides the means of achieving a synthesis of competing interests. I have
no better formula to offer, but certain observations are in order.
First, the synthesizing is to be performed only by persons who are
on one side of the conflict. Only the investors are represented in the
internal decision making process, not employees, customers or the gen-
eral public. I do not suggest that it should be otherwise, but this fact
must be recognized as a limitation on the ability of corporate decision-
makers to decide conflicts against the investors' interest, even when
such a decision is the sounder long-term solution. Certain mechanisms
for providing a public input into the process might be explored, such as
requiring fuller public disclosure of corporate activities, or utilizing
public advisory committees. These devices are not explored.
Second, Mr. Small refers to the long-term interest of investors. I
do not believe investors have long-term interests; their investments are
liquid and terminable. On the other hand, the corporation, the person-
naficta, has a long-term interest. But it must be recognized that when
managers favor that "long-term" interest, they are not simply deferring
benefits to stockholders, they are denying them and shifting benefits to
another group. Ultimately another generation of stockholders will reap
some reward because they will find the corporation a viable investment
vehicle, whereas othersise it might have proven too brittle to survive.
This more precise way of expressing Mr. Small's formula is necessary
in order to appreciate the magnitude of the conduct Mr. Small is quite
properly sanctioning. He is, in reality, saying that today's investors
must be made, or at least may be made, to pay a price for a benefit they
will not receive. This assertion gives wide latitude to managers, wider
perhaps than some who espouse this notion may appreciate. It gives to
the salaried employees of the corporation the discretion to impose costs
on investors balanced by immediate benefits to other community inter-
ests. It makes the notion of long-term profitability a concept with some
bite to it. A recent illustration is provided by Mr. Small in his discus-
sion of the Control Data charter amendment. There may be nothing
remarkably new in all this, however. Several years ago, a court sus-
tained a stock purchase and issuance plan that was used to thwart a
possible takeover of a locally owned newspaper by a large national
chain on grounds that community interest in local ownership could be
weighed by the board along with the interests of the stockholders.'
1. Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972). The contested tender offer
Mr. Small's focus is on the directors. He looks less at how the
board is to be structured than at how the directors should conduct
themselves, or in other words, more on process than on structure.
There are, in truth, only a few restructuring alternatives available if one
is to maintain the large corporation essentially as we know it. More
unaffiliated directors and more committees2 are possible; perhaps some
changes in the nominating and electing process can be achieved, but
these are all modest in scope. They almost trivialize the problem. In-
deed, the modesty of these approaches led one commentator at the re-
cent ALI symposium on corporate structure and governance, Victor
Palmieri, to observe that this entire area which he once thought vital
now appeared to him to be without much significiance at all. Mr. Pal-
mieri added that the really important issue was the role in fact played
by the participants, and he chose to comment upon the role of lawyers.
Mr. Small analyzes in depth the role of directors. Both would seem-to
be crucial.
It is a curious turn that directors have come in for so much atten-
tion as of late. The customary legal formulation, that directors are
charged with the responsibility for managing the business and affairs of
the corporation, is regarded as a quaint relic of simpler times, but is not
a suitable description of today's world. Recently a number of states
have departed from that rule. The corporate critics have berated the
board as an unrepresentative institution composed largely of manage-
provides a dramatic illustration of this analysis. The focus of the federal law regulation of
tender offers is said to be protection of shareholders. Piper v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc. 430
U.S. I (1977). Presumably, a well-informed shareholder will base a decision to accept or
reject a tender offer, in part, on the disclosures made about the target company and the
bidder seeking control. Thus, protection will be afforded to the company. In truth, the
stockholder is influenced almost exclusively by the price. Borden & Weiner, 4n Investment
Decision Analysis of Cash Tender Offer Disclosure, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REy. 553 (1978).
Surely this is rational behavior. A bidder who intends to wreck the target, and is willing to
pay a sufficiently high price to the stockholders in order to gain the chance, is likely to
succeed. The stockholders, it is often observed, have no loyalty to the corporation.
On the other hand, think how different the result would be if it were left to a vote of the
employees. I do not suggest that such a course be followed; I wish only to examine the
notion that the interests of the enterprise and its investors are always co-extensive, and that
worker participation would be destructive. Of course, some employees-the manage-
ment-are already making significant decisions about the future of the company and they
are considering a large number of factors that are not necessarily favored by stockholders.
The rejection by the McGraw-Hill Corporation board of directors of the American Express
tender offer, at a substantial price above the market, was based on many factors. See Opin-
ion of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to McGraw-Hill Board (Jan. 30, 1979).
2. Mr. Small discusses audit, nominating, and compensation committees, but he does
not mention public policy committees. Others, such as the 54th American Assembly, have
discussed the usefulness of the latter.
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ment's rubber stamps. Even those responding to the critics have rarely
defended the board with much vigor. They acknowledge that manage-
ment runs the business and that directors do not have the time or op-
portunity to do anything more than act as an occasional sounding
board. Why, then, does everyone concentrate on the board, this creak-
ing anachronism, as the means to achieve reform, large and small? It
could be that the board is chosen because it is the easiest or only, access
point to outsiders. Whatever its deficiencies, it is there. Mr. Small has
the wisdom to recognize that only modest reforms are within attain-
ment, and he has set his sights low enough to be within reach, yet high
enough to mean something.
Thus, the subject of corporate responsibility goes beyond adher-
ence to the law and includes areas of managerial discretion. Surely,
that is consistent with the descriptions managers provide of their func-
tions. Yet Mr. Small develops with care the role of directors in assur-
ing compliance with law and he does not explore the possibility of
directors in monitoring social performance in a broader spectrum.
Given the great difficulty in formulating any wider role within the ex-
isting framework of corporate law, this may be an appropriate limita-
tion. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that this is only part of
the story.
The director's role is largely a reactive one. Therefore, Mr. Small
concentrates on how directors should react when faced with a proposi-
tion for corporate action that may be illegal. Since illegality rarely pro-
claims itself, directors may, indeed, wind up authorizing programs that
are subsequently judged to be illegal, or not terminating conduct that is
also held to be illegal. No one suggests that accountability should be
based solely on results. What is important is to develop a sensitivity to
the possibility that the law may be violated and to work out a program
that reduces the likelihood. By and large, Marshall Small's suggestions
for doing that make practical sense.
What intensifies the director's interest in the subject is his exposure
to civil liability when the corporation is held to violate the law. Will
the director be liable to the corporation in a derivative suit under those
circumstances? Results alone rarely dictate the conclusion, because
most violations do not so clearly appear, and the usual judgment call
will be close, or the facts bearing on the question may be elusive. It can
be argued that directors would be foolhardy to ignore precautionary
steps (like having an audit committee and institutionalizing a flow of
information), or the taking of certain procedures when considering a
proposed transaction, or in failing to react to suspicions of wrong do-
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ing. They would be foolhardy because these measures describe the new
norms for directors' behavior, and their omission may spell liability
even if that has not always been the case. Earlier standards of lassitude
which have defined the directors' duty of due care may not suffice when
conduct is judged by contemporaneous standards and devices for assur-
ing diligence. Learned Hand's refusal to accept the laggard standards
of an industry as the definition of prudence stands as fair warning.3
Although some sort of business judgment rule is necessary, of
course, I believe Mr. Small is inclined to allow it too much scope. It is
not at all clear what he would do with the like of Graham v. Allis-
Chambers Manufacturing Co. 4 , which many commentators regard as a
most disturbing application of the business-judgment rule. In that case,
the directors of a company convicted as a co-conspirator to fix prices
were found not responsible for the conduct of subordinates, of whose
actual conduct they were ignorant although the company was subject to
a consent decree concerning similar conduct. Critics believe the case
encourages studied indifference to activities not brought directly to the
board's attention; no active monitoring is demanded. Mr. Small
stresses that outside directors are held to a different standard from that
applied to inside directors (although, curiously, he cites only cases de-
cided under federal securities law for this point), and this distinction
may further encourage ostrich-like behavior.
Another troubling aspect of directors' liability that inhibits the de-
velopment of corporate responsibility through action of the board is the
so-called "net benefit rule." As Mr. Small states it, "furthermore, while
there is no proof of harm to the corporation as a result of taking action
subsequently found to be illegal, there has been a tendency to deny
recovery against those responsible for authorizing the transaction, even
where the business judgment rule may not be available as a defense."
By this standard, if a corporation paid a bribe from which it received
commercial advantage, or violated environmental control standards to
avoid an expensive retooling, or engaged in similar profitable trade
offs, there could be no recovery in a derivative suit against the officials
for the gross loss. The benefits from the illegal action could set off
those expenditures. Moreover, it would seem that the burden of proof
might even be on the objecting stockholders to establish the net loss.
Well, why is this not sound? After all, the corporation has suffered
3. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). See generally Coffee, Beyondthe Shut-
Eyed Sentry. Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal
Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1185 if. (1977).
4. 41 Del. Ch 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963).
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no harm, and those that have, can bring their own suit. Additionally,
there is always the possibility of criminal action. First, the law might
appropriately react that it is against public policy to allow a set-off
from the gains of illegal activity. Such a view is surely not unknown;
witness the tax law's denial of certain deductions. As to the availability
of other remedies, these may be more theoretical than real. The victims
may have a hard time recognizing themselves in the situation I have
described, or there may be standing problems. For the same reasons,
the New York Court of Appeals (the same jurisdiction that created the
net benefit rule) allowed corporate recovery when insider trading oc-
curred, in Diamond v. Oreamuno,5 largely because this was an effective
deterrent to conduct properly discouraged. Thus, corporate recovery
might be allowed when violations of the law occur. While Judge Fuld
went to some pains in Diamond to argue that there was corporate in-
jury, the argument is not really believable. Indeed, the two jurisdic-
tions subsequently confronted with the same or similar problem have
refused to follow Diamond on precisely the grounds that no corporate
injury was shown.6 However, most observers of the corporate scene
lavish praise on Diamond as evidence that state courts are fully capable
of protecting the interests of minority stockholders.
I recognize that there is an important distinction because Diamond
was a self-dealing situation where it is especially offensive to allow
fiduciaries to retain the benefits of their offending conduct. Moreover,
the nexus to the corporation of the impropriety is much stronger.
Nonetheless, the case points to the great practical disciplining effect of
stockholder derivative litigation to enforce standards of public policy.
It is not squarely on point, but it is a commendable extension of the
doctrine. A further distinction, and a more troubling one perhaps, is
that in Diamond the recovery equals the wrongdoer's personal gain,
even if it is not the measure of the corporation's loss. In the violation of
the antitrust laws, and the like, typically the gross loss is not the meas-
ure of the director's gain; in fact there may be no such gain at all. In
such a case courts will be reluctant to impose damages. Courts, there-
fore, need new remedies at their disposal, such as banishment or sus-
pension from the board, in order that they have an alternative to
imposing money damages.
Finally, Mr. Small raises the issue of the role of stockholders in
imposing on directors their views on how the corporation should be
5. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
6. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying Indiana law); Schein
v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975).
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governed. This issue is given a new urgency because of the Supreme
Court's decision in First National Bank ofBoston v. Belloti,7 which per-
mits corporations to take positions in the political arena. In his re-
sponse to Justice White's concern, in dissent, about the potential for
management to waste the stockholders money on political causes that
do not enhance the common goal of the stockholders, Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, noted, among other things, that the corporate
political process was available to protect dissidents. All of us, including
Justice Powell, realize the limited viability of that process, but perhaps
his observation, when coupled with the broad recognition of corpora-
tion rights recognized in the opinion, underscore the need to provide
full opportunity for stockholder input into the decision making process.
Mr. Small recognizes it, and he observes that there is value in allowing
some vehicle for shareholder contribution to the nomination process
and in welcoming stockholder proposals for inclusion in the proxy
statement.
I think shareholder participation enriches the process and is de-
serving of enthusiastic support. It is the process, and only the process,
that matters because shareholder proposals or nominations will prevail
under only the most unusual circumstances. The increased institution-
alization of the stockholder body provides more expertise and more
clout to that group, which should not be overlooked. The shareholder
role reminds management of its limited right to exercise their massive
power. And the process ventilates numerous issues management, and
even most of the stockholders, do not customarily relate to the conduct
of corporate business. The ensuing articulation of positions, in the
open forum of proxy solicitations and annual meetings, will, and does,
achieve beneficial results.
There is an immense amount of wisdom, practical advice, and first
rate scholarship in Marshall Small's article. I have only scratched some
of what I consider to be the rougher edges of the surface. On the whole
I think he proposes appropriate steps in the development of a body of
corporate law that will help promote not only the stockholders' inter-
ests, but the interests of sound public policy as well.
7. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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